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DECEIVED BY DISPARITY STUDIES: WHY THE TENTH
CIRCUIT FAILED TO APPLY CROSON'S STRICT SCRUTINY
STANDARD IN CONCRETE WORKS OF COLORADO
INTRODUCTION
Many state and local governments across the country, including the
City and County of Denver, utilize affirmative action programs that
strive to increase Minority Business Enterprise ("MBE") participation in
government construction and professional design projects. In City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,' the Supreme Court held that such race-
based programs must pass strict scrutiny analysis. 2 The Court found that
the City of Richmond's MBE program did not withstand strict scrutiny,
and, thus, invalidated the program as violating the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3
In light of the Croson decision, many local governments eliminated
or modified their MBE programs because of constitutional concerns.4 In
an effort to defend their MBE programs, some governments commenced
statistical studies to help pass Croson's strict scrutiny analysis. 5 This
reaction is based on language in Croson stating: "[w]here there is a sig-
nificant statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority
contractors willing and able to perform a particular service and the num-
ber of such contractors actually engaged by the locality or the locality's
prime contractors, an inference of discriminatory exclusion could arise."6
Governments also look to anecdotal evidence to supplement the sta-
tistical evidence in disparity studies.7 In Croson, the Court reasoned that
anecdotal evidence, "if supported by appropriate statistical proof," can
support a government's contention that broad remedial relief is neces-
sary. Anecdotal evidence can show that discrimination is the underlying
cause of disparate statistics, rather than some other race-neutral cause. 9
1. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
2. Croson, 488 U.S. at 494-95. Strict scrutiny requirements are discussed infra notes 31-56
and accompanying text.
3. Id. at 511.
4. Jeffrey M. Hanson, Hanging by Yarns?: Deficiencies in Anecdotal Evidence Threaten the
Survival of Race-Based Preference Programs for Public Contracting, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1433,
1444 (2003).
5. Id. at 1444-45.
6. Id. at 1444 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 509).
7. Id. at 1447-48.
8. Id. at 1448 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 509).
9. Id. at 1448-49.
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Reacting to Croson, the City and County of Denver ("Denver")
conducted in-depth statistical studies to support its MBE program. 10
Concrete Works of Colorado ("CWC") challenged Denver's affirmative
action ordinance, claiming that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."'
This Survey discusses affirmative action programs as applied to
public contracting, and the requirements promulgated by the Supreme
Court to pass strict scrutiny analysis. Part I explains the emergence of
judicial strict scrutiny as the standard for government race-conscious
programs. Part I also discusses the Tenth Circuit's decision in Concrete
Works and the facts supporting its decision. In Part II, this survey dis-
cusses the Third and Eleventh Circuit's application of strict scrutiny. Part
III examines Justice Scalia's reaction to the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari for Concrete Works. Part IV analyzes the strict scrutiny stan-
dard promulgated by the Supreme Court in Croson, and assesses whether
or not the Tenth Circuit adhered to that standard. Additionally, Part IV
addresses Justice Scalia's criticisms of the Tenth Circuit, as well as the
Third and Eleventh Circuit's application of strict scrutiny.
I. STRICT SCRUTINY: THE TEST FOR GOVERNMENT AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PROGRAMS
A. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond
2
Croson stands as the seminal case establishing strict scrutiny as the
test for racial classifications benefiting minorities.13 Prior to 1989, when
Croson was decided, no binding jurisprudence existed regarding the level
14of scrutiny for government affirmative action programs.
1. Facts
In Croson, the Richmond City Council ("the City Council") adopted
the Minority Business Utilization Plan ("the Plan"), which required
prime contractors to subcontract at least 30% of their contract amount to
one or more MBEs. I5 An MBE was defined as a "business at least fifty-
one (51) percent of which is owned and controlled.., by minority group
members."' 6 The Plan defined "minority group members" as "citizens of
the United States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts."' 7 The City Council declared the Plan to be remedial
10. See Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 962-69
(10th Cir. 2003).
11. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 957.
12. 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
13. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 706 (2d ed.
2002).
14. See id.
15. Croson, 488 U.S at 477.
16. Id. at 478.
17. Id.
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in nature with the purpose of "promoting wider participation by minority
business enterprises in the construction of public projects."
18
Additionally, the Plan authorized waivers to contractors who made
"every feasible attempt" to comply with the 30% set-aside requirement
but could not.' 9 The waivers could only be granted in exceptional cir-
cumstances and contractors were required to demonstrate that "qualified
Minority Business Enterprises . . . [were] unavailable or unwilling to
participate in the contract to enable meeting the 30% MBE goal. 2°
The City Council adopted the Plan after holding a public hearing.21
Plan proponents relied upon a study indicating that, while Blacks consti-
tuted 50% of Richmond's general population, the city awarded only
0.67% of prime construction contracts to MBEs during a five year pe-
riod.22 The City Council also relied upon oral statements made at the
public hearing claiming that discrimination existed in the construction
industry both nationally and locally.23 Notwithstanding the study and
anecdotal statements, the city failed to present any direct evidence indi-
cating it had participated in race discrimination, or that prime contractors
had discriminated against MBEs.24
After the Plan's adoption, Richmond issued an invitation to bid on
the installation of plumbing fixtures for the city jail, and J.A. Croson
Company ("Croson"), a prime contractor, received the project bid
forms. 25 Despite Croson's efforts to procure bids from MBEs, no MBE
expressed an interest in the project until the day the bid was due, when
Croson secured an MBE for the project.26
However, the MBE was unable to obtain credit and, therefore, sub-
mitted a bid to Croson that would have caused the entire project to ex-
ceed the proposed budget.27 As a result, Croson applied for a waiver.28
Richmond denied Croson's request for a waiver and decided to re-bid the
project.29 Consequently, Croson brought an action against Richmond
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the Plan was unconstitutional on its




20. Id. at 478-79.
21. Id. at 479.
22. Id. at 479-80.
23. Id. at 480.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 481.
26. Id. at 482.
27. Id. at 482-83.
28. Id. at 482.
29. Id. at 483.
30. Id.
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2. Decision
The Court in Croson established the constitutional standards to
which affirmative action programs are subject. Specifically, the Court
held that a government must present a "strong basis in evidence" 3' that a
program is "narrowly tailored ' 32 to serve a "compelling interest. 33
The Plan failed the compelling governmental interest prong of strict
scrutiny analysis.34 The Court reasoned that Richmond could satisfy the
compelling governmental interest requirement if it demonstrated that it
was a "passive participant" in a system of racial discrimination. 35 A gov-
ernment is a passive participant in racial discrimination when it uses pub-
lic dollars to employ private firms that engage in discriminatory con-
duct.36 The Court reasoned that all state and federal governments have a
compelling interest to ensure that public tax dollars, which are drawn
from all citizens, do not finance groups that participate in discriminatory
conduct.37
However, no direct evidence existed that showed Richmond or
prime contractors had discriminated against MBEs.38 The Court held that
a state must identify "discrimination, public or private, with some speci-
ficity before [it] may use race-conscious relief., 39 Richmond's attempt to
use past societal discrimination as the basis for its affirmative action pro-
gram would "open the door to competing claims for 'remedial relief for
every disadvantaged group. 4°
Furthermore, the Court determined that the statistics comparing
Richmond's minority population to the percentage of prime contracts
awarded to MBEs "had little or no probative value in establishing prior
discrimination" in the construction industry. 4' The fact that Blacks con-
stituted 50% of the city's general population, but only received 0.67% of
the city's prime construction contracts, was nothing more than a "general
population statistic. ' '42 The Court held that "when special qualifications
are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population
(rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the neces-
31. Id. at 500.
32. Id. at 506-07.
33. Id. at 505. This survey refers to the Court's two-part strict scrutiny test as composed of
"two prongs": the first being compelling interest and the second narrow tailoring.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 492 ("[1]f the city could show that it had essentially become a 'passive participant'
in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry, we think it
clear that the city could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system.").
36. See id. at 492-93.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 480.
39. Id. at 504.
40. Id. at 505.
41. Id. at 485 (citing J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (4th Cir.
1987) (Croson M1)).
42. Croson 11, 822 F.2d at 1358-59.
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sary qualifications) may have little probative value," 43 and such compari-
sons actually suggest the Plan was "more of a political than a remedial
basis for the racial preference." 44
The Plan also failed the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny
analysis.45 A fatal flaw of the Plan was its over-inclusiveness,46 as there
was no evidence of "discrimination against Spanish-speaking, Oriental,
Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons" in the local construction industry.47
The Court reasoned that the "random inclusion" of additional racial
groups indicated the Plan was not remedial in nature.4 The Plan could
not possibly serve a remedial purpose if a person of Aleut or Eskimo
descent had never resided in Richmond.49 In addition, the City Council
chose the 30% set-aside figure arbitrarily, failing to show any relevance
to the actual number of MBEs in Richmond, or to any other pertinent
statistic .0
In the absence of evidence of specific instances of discrimination,
the Court required Richmond to consider race-neutral alternatives before
utilizing a race-based plan.51 However, Richmond failed to consider the
use of race-neutral means to increase MBE participation in city con-
tracts.52 The Court proffered an array of race-neutral means by which
Richmond could increase MBE participation, including simplifying the
bidding process, relaxing the bonding requirements, training, and offer-
ing financial assistance.
53
The Plan in Croson was fatally flawed and did not withstand strict
scrutiny. Richmond failed to produce valid statistical evidence concern-
ing discrimination.54 Thus, Richmond could not meet the compelling
governmental interest requirement. Additionally, the arbitrary 30% re-
quirement and the inclusion of extraneous racial groups demonstrated
that the Plan was not narrowly tailored. Significantly, the test set forth
43. Croson, 488 U.S. at 485 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
309 n.13 (1977)).
44. Id. at 485 (citing Croson II, 822 F.2d at 1359). The appeals court in Croson 11 explained
that general population statistics failed to address the statistical disparity between the percentage of
qualified minority business contractors doing business in the city and the percentage of bid funds
awarded to those businesses. Id.
45. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.




50. Id. at 499.
51. Id. at 509.
52. Id. at 507.
53. Id. at 509-10.
54. Id. at 505.
55. Id. at 507.
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by the Court in Croson established that racial classifications benefiting
minorities must withstand strict scrutiny analysis.56
B. Tenth Circuit: Deciphering Croson in Concrete Works of Colorado v.
City and County of Denver
5 7
1. Facts
In 1990, the City and County of Denver adopted an affirmative ac-
tion program, codified as Ordinance No. 513 ("Ordinance"). 58 The Ordi-
nance applied to all city contracts in which a bid was required to receive
a construction project.5 9 The Ordinance required the utilization of MBEs
and Women Business Enterprises ("WBEs") on construction projects
with Denver.60 The Ordinance defined MBEs as businesses: "(1) at least
51% owned by one or more eligible minorities and (2) with daily busi-
ness operations controlled by one or more eligible minorities."6' The
Ordinance defined minorities as "persons of Black, Hispanic, Asian-
American, or American Indian descent."62 The Ordinance required that
16% of the annual dollar amount spent by Denver on construction con-
tracts must be awarded to MBEs.63
Contractors and subcontractors who placed bids on Denver con-
tracts were also required to comply with the Ordinance's criteria. 64 Con-
tractors could comply with the Ordinance either by meeting the project
participation goals or by demonstrating good faith efforts to meet the
participation goals. 65 Under the Ordinance, contractors could meet the
good faith exemption if they attempted to subcontract with MBEs but
were unsuccessful. 66 A contractor could also demonstrate good faith ef-
forts if he rejected an MBE because the MBE failed to submit the lowest
bid or was unqualified.67 If a contractor failed to meet the participation
goals or the good faith requirement, Denver would consider the contrac-
tor's bid "not responsive."
56. Id. at 509.
57. 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003).
58. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 956.
59. Id.
60. Id. For the purposes of this Survey, only MBE, and not WBE, programs are discussed.
Race-based programs are subject to strict scrutiny, which is the focus of this Survey.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The Ordinance was subsequently amended in 1996 and again in 1998. Id. The 1996
Ordinance expanded the scope of contracts that were covered by the 1999 Ordinance. Id. The 1998
Ordinance reduced the MBE participation goal from 16% to 10%. Id. at 956-57. For the purposes of
this Survey, the 1996 and 1998 amendments have no effect on the strict scrutiny analysis. As such,
this Survey's discussion is limited to the 1990 Ordinance.
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Concrete Works of Colorado ("CWC"), a construction firm owned
by a non-minority male, lost three contracts with Denver when it failed
to comply with the MBE participation goals or meet the good faith re-
quirements set forth in the Ordinance.69 Consequently, CWC filed a
complaint against Denver seeking damages and injunctive relief, claim-
ing that the Ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 70 After the district court ruled that the Ordinance
violated the Equal Protection Clause, Denver appealed.7'
2. Decision
a. Burden of Proof
The Tenth Circuit assessed the burden of proof Denver had to meet
in order to uphold the constitutionality of the Ordinance.72 According to
the Tenth Circuit, Denver could satisfy its burden "without conclusively
proving the existence of past or present racial discrimination., 73 Thus,
Denver could proffer statistical and anecdotal evidence to demonstrate a
disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors and the
number of such contractors actually utilized by local prime contractors.74
Moreover, Denver could meet its burden by "presenting evidence of its
own direct participation in racial discrimination or its passive participa-
tion in private discrimination. 75
Once Denver met its initial burden, CWC was required to "intro-
duce 'credible, particularized evidence to rebut [Denver's] initial show-
ing of ... a compelling interest.', 76 CWC could rebut Denver's statistical
evidence "by (1) showing that the statistics [were] flawed; (2) demon-
strating that the disparities shown by the statistics [were] not significant
or actionable; or (3) presenting contrasting statistical data.' 77 The court
held that the burden of proof at all times remained with CWC to prove
the unconstitutionality of the Ordinance.
b. Statistical Evidence
The Tenth Circuit held that Denver demonstrated a compelling gov-
ernmental interest by producing detailed statistical evidence. 79 Denver
hired several independent research firms to conduct disparity studies in
69. Id. at 957.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 957-58.
73. Id. at 958.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 959 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1175 (10th Cir.
2000) (alteration in original)).
77. Id. (quoting Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 921 (9th Cir. 1991)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 990.
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an effort to justify the Ordinance. 80 The studies created a disparity index
by dividing the percentage of MBE participation in city contracts by the
percentage of MBEs in the local construction population.81 A disparity
index of "one" indicated full MBE utilization, whereas an index closer to
zero indicated underutilization of MBEs.8z Such disparity indices showed
a statistical underutilization of MBEs on Denver projects.83
The court further reasoned that an inference of discriminatory con-
duct could be drawn from statistical disparities.84 Furthermore, Denver
was not required to show that discriminatory conduct in the construction
industry differed from societal discrimination. 85 The court determined
that it was irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether industry dis-
crimination was a result of societal discrimination or whether such dis-
crimination was "the product of policies, practices, and attitudes unique
to the industry., 86 Thus, the Tenth Circuit criticized the district court for
erroneously requiring Denver to show that the existence of discrimina-
tory conduct was more than a reflection of general societal discrimina-
tion.87 Instead, Denver was only required to demonstrate a strong basis in
evidence of discrimination, not prove discrimination.88
The court included additional reasons supporting its finding that
Denver's statistical evidence was sufficient to satisfy the compelling
governmental interest requirement. First, Denver's statistical evidence
did not suffer from the same flaws as the evidence presented in Croson.
89
In Croson, Richmond's MBE program included racial groups that may
never have experienced discrimination. 90 In Concrete Works, by contrast,
Denver presented evidence of discrimination against each racial group
included in the Ordinance. 91 However, Denver was not required to prove
that each racial group experienced discrimination equally.92 Secondly,
the court relied on studies indicating that MBEs experienced difficulties
obtaining financing and forming businesses.93
80. Id. at 962.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 990-91. Denver hired numerous independent research firms to conduct multiple
disparity studies. The disparity indices for MBEs varied, but were always less than one. See id. at
962-69.
84. Id. at 971.
85. Id. at 972.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 973.
88. Id. at 971. "Denver was under no burden to identify any specific practice or policy that
resulted in discrimination." Id. at 972. Nor was Denver "required to demonstrate that the purpose of
any such practice or policy was to disadvantage women or minorities." Id. Such a burden would be
equivalent to "requiring direct proof." Id.
89. Id. at 971.
90. Croson, 488 U.S at 506.
91. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 971.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 979.
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In challenging the statistical evidence presented by Denver, CWC
highlighted one study in particular that failed to control for firm size and
experience.94 CWC asserted that the disparities shown in the studies
could be attributable to firm size and lack of experience, rather than dis-
crimination.95 Thus, CWC argued, the disparities were inflated because
the studies did not reflect MBEs that were actually "qualified, willing,
and able to work on City projects., 96 The court rejected CWC's argu-
ments that failure to control for firm size and experience invalidated
Denver's statistical evidence.97 The court reasoned that statistical evi-
dence indicated that MBEs experienced lending discrimination and faced
difficulties forming businesses.98 Consequently, such discrimination
caused MBEs to be smaller and less experienced. 99 Moreover, CWC did
not conduct its own disparity study to rebut Denver's statistical find-
ings.' 0 Therefore, the court held that CWC did not meet its burden to
discredit the evidence Denver presented.' 0 '
c. Anecdotal Evidence
Denver produced considerable anecdotal evidence that supported
the claim that racial discrimination existed in the construction industry. 02
The evidence included testimony of an executive of a large non-minority
owned construction firm, who stated that "he received credible com-
plaints from minority and women-owned construction firms that they
were subject to different work rules than majority-owned firms. 0 3 The
executive also stated that he witnessed racial-based graffiti on job sites in
the local area.' °4 MBEs testified that they had difficulty in pre-qualifying
for private sector projects and that their bids were rejected even when
they were the lowest bidder. 1
05
One study indicated that some Denver employees and private con-
tractors attempted to circumvent the Ordinance goals. 0 6 Denver employ-
ees would create a "change order" to an existing contract, rather than
create a new bid for work. 10 7 Employees also characterized some projects
as "remodeling" instead of a construction project because remodels were
not subject to the participation goals. 0 8 Finally, anecdotal evidence indi-
94. Id. at 980.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 981.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 982.
101. Id.
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cated that contractors would call WBEs that were out of business in an
attempt to meet the good faith requirements."°
The court found that Denver's anecdotal evidence included "several
incidents involving profoundly disturbing behavior," and that it revealed
"behavior that was not merely sophomoric or insensitive, but which re-
sulted in real economic or physical harm." 110 The court concluded that
the anecdotal evidence provided "persuasive, unrebutted support for
Denver's initial burden.""'
When the Tenth Circuit weighed both the statistical and anecdotal
evidence, it held that Denver had a compelling governmental interest in
remedying racial discrimination in the construction industry." 2 In addi-
tion, CWC failed to rebut Denver's evidentiary showing. Thus, the court
held that the Ordinance was constitutional and did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 13
II. How OTHER CIRCUITS HAVE APPLIED CROSON'S STRICT SCRUTINY
STANDARD




The City of Philadelphia implemented an affirmative action pro-
gram that sought to increase participation of "disadvantaged business
enterprises" (DBEs) in city construction contracts. 15 DBEs were defined
as businesses "at least 51% owned by 'socially and economically disad-
vantaged' persons." '" 6 Racial minorities were included in the DBE cate-
109. Id. No anecdotal evidence was introduced that the same conduct took place with MBEs:
the evidence indicated that only out-of-business WBEs were called in attempt to meet the good faith
requirements. Id.
110. Id. at 989.
Ill. Id. at 990.
112. Id. at 992.
113. See id. at 994. The Tenth Circuit did not discuss the second prong of strict scrutiny: nar-
row tailoring. Shortly after CWC brought suit in 1992, Denver moved for summary judgment. Id. at
992. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted Denver's motion for sum-
mary judgment. Id. The court concluded that Denver established a compelling interest and that
Denver's program was narrowly tailored. Id. The Tenth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judg-
ment on the compelling interest issue and concluded that CWC had waived any challenge to the
narrow tailoring decision reached by the district court. Id. Because CWC did not challenge the
district court's conclusion with respect to narrow tailoring, the Tenth Circuit did not address the
issue. Id.
114. 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996).
115. Contractors Ass'n, 91 F.3d at 591.
116. Id.
[Vol. 81:3
DECEIVED BY DISPARITY STUDIES
gory and participation goals for MBEs were set at 15% of the total dollar
amount spent by Philadelphia on construction-related projects.'17
At trial, Philadelphia presented disparity indices that calculated the
utilization of black construction firms.' 8 Philadelphia's expert, Dr. An-
drew F. Brimmer, calculated the "participation rate" by dividing the
number of prime contracts awarded to MBEs by the total number of pub-
lic contracts awarded. 1 9 Brimmer then calculated the "availability rate"
by dividing the number of black construction firms in the Philadelphia
metro area by the total number of black construction firms in the Phila-
delphia metro area. 120 Based on Brimmer's calculations, the disparity
index of 22.5 indicated racial discrimination in the construction indus-
try.
121
In addition to the statistical analysis, Philadelphia produced a report
from a former Philadelphia employee concerning the participation of
MBEs on public works projects.122 The employee, John Macklin, testi-
fied that he reviewed 25 to 30 percent of the project engineer logs, which
tracked firm names that had participated in city projects. 123 Macklin re-
lied on his personal memory to determine whether a firm in the log was
an MBE.124 When questioned whether it was possible that MBEs had
participated in city construction projects, Macklin responded, "it is a very
good possibility."'
' 25
Another witness introduced by Philadelphia testified that, in his
opinion, black contractors were subject to racial discrimination in the
construction industry. 26 However, the witness was unable to identify a
specific instance of discriminatory conduct.1
27
2. Decision
The district court found that Brimmer's analysis, coupled with the
anecdotal evidence, failed to demonstrate a compelling governmental
interest.2 8 Philadelphia demonstrated nothing more than a "generalized
assertion" that discrimination in the construction industry occurred.
129
117. Id. at 591-92. The Third Circuit declared that portions of the program which required set-
asides for women and non-black minority contractors were unconstitutional. Id. at 593-94. Thus, the
focus of this case is on the constitutionality of the program as applied to black contractors. Id. at 594.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 595 n.9.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 594-95.





127. Id. at 600-01.
128. Id. at 601-02.
129. Id. at 609 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989)).
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Moreover, Philadelphia failed to provide an evidentiary basis on which
to infer that a program was required to redress racial discrimination. 30
Brimmer's study did not take into account whether black construc-
tion firms were "qualified and willing" to perform city construction pro-
jects.1 3' Additionally, the statistics in the study were derived from vary-
ing sources, and the study did not account for a neutral explanation for
low utilization of MBEs.
132
The court reasoned that, when a strong evidentiary basis is lacking,
racial classifications are a form of racial politics. 133 Ultimately, however,
the court said that the question of whether a strong basis in evidence ex-
isted was "a close call" and did not rule on the issue. 134 Instead, the court
decided that the program did not satisfy the narrow tailoring prong and,
thus, invalidated Philadelphia's race-based preference program for
violating the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 135
B. Eleventh Circuit: Engineering Contractors Ass'n of South Florida,
Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County
136
1. Facts
The Eleventh Circuit used disparity studies to determine the consti-
tutionality of Dade County's ("County") MBE program. 137 The program
established set-aside requirements and participation goals for MBEs.138
At trial, the County presented statistical studies that compared (1) the
percentage of bidders that were MBEs; (2) the percentage of awardees
that were MBEs; and (3) the proportion of County contract dollars that
were awarded to MBEs. 139 The disparity index indicated an underutiliza-
tion of MBEs in County construction contracts. 140 However, when the
study controlled for firm size, most of the disparities were insignifi-
cant. 14 In other words, the disparities were explained by small firm size
rather than by discriminatory conduct. 142
In addition to insignificant disparities, the methodology used to cal-
culate MBE participation was seriously flawed. 143 The County calculated
MBE participation rates by dividing the dollar amount received by
130. Id.
131. Id. at 602-03.
132. Id. at 603.
133. Id. at 610.
134. Id. at 605.
135. Id. at 602.
136. 122 F.3d 895 (1lth Cir. 1997).
137. Eng'g Contractors Ass'n, 122 F.3d at 911-24.
138. Id. at 901.
139. ld. at 912.
140. Id. at 916.
141. Id. at 917.
142. Id. at 918.
143. Id. at 920.
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MBEs, by the total dollar amount received by construction companies,
regardless of where the work occurred. 44 This calculation method would
substantially decrease MBE participation rates.
45
The County commissioned another study that "(1) compared con-
struction business ownership rates of [MBEs] to those of [non-MBEs]
and (2) analyzed disparities in personal income between [MBE and non-
MBE] business owners." 146 The study found that minorities are less
likely to own their own businesses than white males, and that MBEs in
the construction industry earned less money than non-MBEs.147 The
study concluded that current and past discrimination caused disparities in
construction business entry rates and caused the differential in income.
48
Despite the study's results, the court rejected the study's validity, citing
the rationale in Croson that a disproportionate entrance of minorities to
the construction industry does not conclusively mean that discrimination
exists. 149 Furthermore, the study failed to consider firm size, which dis-
credited the results.150
In addition to statistical evidence, the County introduced significant
anecdotal evidence that revealed discrimination in County construction
projects. 51 County employees testified concerning incidents that required
MBEs to complete lengthy punch lists (lists that required work to be re-
done), when non-MBEs were not required to complete punch lists.152 The
employees also testified that MBEs had difficulty obtaining bonding and
financing.1 53 Additionally, MBEs testified regarding numerous incidents
of discrimination while bidding for jobs and when dealing with project
foremen. 54 Other MBEs that responded to a survey claimed that they
faced countless instances of discrimination including difficulty obtaining
financing and unfair performance evaluations.1
55
2. Decision
The court found that the anecdotal evidence painted a grim picture
of racial discrimination in the construction industry. 156 However, anecdo-
tal evidence is only persuasive if it is "combined with and reinforced by
sufficiently probative statistical evidence."'' 57 The court conceded that
144. Id. at 919-20.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 921.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 922.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 923.
151. Id. at 924.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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anecdotal evidence can show the perception of discrimination and can
bolster statistical evidence. 58 The court further acknowledged that it
could support a local government's determination that remedial relief in
the form of a race-based program is warranted. 59 However, "[w]ithout
the requisite statistical foundation for the anecdotal evidence to reinforce,
supplement, support, and bolster.. ." no firm evidentiary basis existed to
justify an MBE program. t6° Because the County's statistical foundation
failed to show a strong basis in evidence, the anecdotal evidence was
insufficient to meet the compelling governmental interest requirement.
16'
Thus, the County's MBE program was unconstitutional as violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
62
III. JUSTICE SCALIA RESPONDS TO CONCRETE WORKS AND CLARIFIES
THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST
The Supreme Court denied the Tenth Circuit's petition for writ of
163certiorari. Justice Scalia dissented from the denial of certiorari and
attacked the Tenth Circuit's decision without constraint.'t64 Scalia's ar-
guments that criticize the Tenth Circuit are first, that the Tenth Circuit
incorrectly allocated the burden of proof, and second, the statistics pre-
sented by Denver do not meet Croson's strong basis in evidence stan-
dard.
1 65
A. Burden of Proof
Scalia argues that the Tenth Circuit erroneously applied Croson's
burden of proof standard: "a proper plaintiff challenging governmental
use of [affirmative action programs] can state a prima facie case simply
by pointing to this practice and showing that he or she was treated un-
equally because of his or her race."' 166 The burden of defending an af-
firmative action program then falls to the government, which must estab-
lish that it is remedying "identified discrimination" and that it "had a
strong basis in evidence" to take remedial action.1 67 However, the Tenth
Circuit only required Denver to demonstrate "strong evidence from
which an inference of past or present discrimination could be drawn."
' 68
The court then required CWC to "introduce credible, particularized evi-
158. Id. at 925-26.
159. Id. at 925.
160. Id. at 926.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 929. Although the County failed to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest,
the court proceeded with a narrow tailoring discussion in an effort to complete the analysis of strict
scrutiny. Id. at 926-29. The court found that the County's MBE program was not narrowly tailored
and, thus, confirmed the district court's decision in finding the program unconstitutional. Id. at 929.
163. Concrete Works of Colo. v. City & County of Denver, 124 S. Ct. 556, 556 (2003).
164. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. at 556.
165. Id. at 557.
166. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
167. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
168. Id. at 558 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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dence to rebut Denver's initial showing of the existence of a compelling
interest."1 69 Scalia argues that Denver's burden was easily met, while
CWC faced a "daunting task."'' 70 According to Scalia, "the Tenth Circuit
got it exactly backwards."' 7' When a contractor establishes that a gov-
ernment uses racial preferences, the government's conduct is presumed
unconstitutional. 172 Thus, the government bears the burden to prove that
"it is acting on the basis of a compelling interest in remedying racial dis-
crimination."'' 73 Consequently, according to Scalia, the Tenth Circuit's
erroneous burden of proof allocation had an outcome-determinative ef-
fect on Concrete Works. 1
74
B. Statistical Evidence
Croson states that a government must show a "significant statistical
disparity" between the number of contractors hired and "the number of
qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform a particular
service . . . .""' Scalia contends that Denver's statistical studies were
inadequate because they failed to use actual bidding data.176 In addition,
the studies did not control for MBE qualifications, willingness, and
availability. 177 Rather, Denver assumed that MBEs were as qualified,
willing, and able as non-MBEs. 178 Scalia argues that Denver's studies
incorrectly compared all MBEs, instead of actual MBEs who were
"qualified, willing, and able."' 179 Furthermore, Scalia argues that Cro-
son's standards should be fatal to affirmative action programs when a
government's statistical evidence, such as Denver's, does not support its
claim that the program is remedial in nature.
80
Another significant flaw to Denver's statistical studies was the fail-
ure to control for firm size. Even if it was correct to assume that all
MBEs were qualified, willing, and able, it was not proper to assume that
all MBEs had an equal opportunity in obtaining city contracts as non-
MBEs. l8 1 Scalia asserts that large construction firms posses a clear ad-
vantage over smaller firms in obtaining projects. 182 The evidence pre-
sented by Denver revealed that MBEs were, on average, smaller and less





174. See id. at 558 ("Since Denver had to establish nothing more than the possibility of prior
discrimination... the injured contractor was required to rebut the possibility of discrimination in the
Denver construction industry.").
175. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989) (emphasis added).
176. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. at 558-59.
177. Id.
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experienced than non-MBEs. 183 However, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that MBEs were generally smaller and less experienced because of dis-
crimination.184 According to Scalia, "[t]he argument fails because it rests
on nothing but speculation."' 185 Denver's studies did not control for criti-
cal variables that would have provided a neutral explanation for underuti-
lization of MBEs.1
86
Moreover, Denver introduced studies that showed disparities in
MBE business formation rates and in access to capital. 87 Scalia asserts
that disparities in these generalized areas would permit racial preferences
in virtually every field of enterprise. 88 According to Croson, reliance
upon such general societal discrimination "has no logical stopping
point."'189 Race-neutral alternatives exist to combat lending and business
formation barriers such as "prohibiting discrimination in the provision of
credit ... by local suppliers and banks."' 190 Such lending discrimination
does not give rise to a compelling state interest in remedying racial dis-
crimination in the construction industry.
Scalia concluded his dissent by stating:
If the evidence relied upon by governmental units ... can be as in-
conclusive as Denver's evidence in this case, our former insistence
upon a 'strong basis in evidence' has been abandoned, to be replaced
by what amounts to an 'apparent-good-faith' requirement - that is, in
the words of the Tenth Circuit, the existence of 'evidence from which
an inference of past or present discrimination could be drawn.' 191
"[T]he Court's decision to let this plain disregard of Croson stand
invites speculation that that case has effectively been overruled."'
192
183. Concrete Works of Colo. v. City & County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 981 (10th Cir.
2003).
184. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 981.
185. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. at 559.




189. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S 267, 275
(1986)).
190. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. at 560 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 510).
191. Id. at 560-61.
192. Id. at 556. Scalia's statement that Croson has "effectively been overruled" is derived from
the Court's denial of certiorari in Concrete Works, and the Court's recent decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct 2325 (2003). In Grutter, the Court gave much deference to the University of
Michigan's educational judgment that "diversity is essential to its educational mission." Grutter, 123
S. Ct. at 2339. Scalia criticized the Court's willingness to rely upon good faith when it stated in
Grutter that "[w]e take the Law School at its word that it would like nothing better than to find a
race-neutral admissions formula and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as
practicable." Id. at 2346 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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IV. ANALYSIS
As set forth in Croson, government affirmative action programs are
subject to strict scrutiny analysis. 193 A strong basis in evidence must exist
for a government to show that its program is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.1 94 Justice Scalia criticized the Tenth
Circuit for allocating the burden of proof to the opponent of an affirma-
tive action program. Scalia's other criticisms included the quality of
Denver's statistical evidence and Denver's failure to consider race-
neutral alternatives before implementing the Ordinance. 195 This analysis
section will discuss Justice Scalia's criticisms of the Tenth Circuit's de-
cision. In addition, this section will discuss the quality of statistics re-
quired to show a strong basis in evidence, and the role anecdotal evi-
dence plays in supplementing statistical evidence.
A. Burden of Proof
Although Croson held that accurate statistics could create an infer-
ence of discrimination, the Court in Croson did not give specific guid-
ance on issues such as which party bears the ultimate burden of proof
under strict scrutiny analysis. 196 As such, courts are free to interpret Cro-
son's burden of proof requirement.
1 97
In Concrete Works,198 the Tenth Circuit discussed the burden of
proof that each party was required to meet. The court stated that Denver
could "meet its burden without conclusively proving the existence of past
or present racial discrimination."' 199 An ultimate judicial finding of dis-
crimination was not required before Denver implemented its affirmative
action program. 200 Thus, Denver was only required to present strong evi-
dence from which an inference of past or present discrimination could be
drawn.20 1 The court defined strong evidence as that which "'approach[es]
a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory violation,' not irrefuta-
ble or definitive proof of discrimination ' 20 2 Once Denver met its burden,
CWC was required to introduce "credible, particularized evidence to
rebut Denver's initial showing of the existence of a compelling inter-
est.' '2°3 The court held "that the burden of proof at all times remain[ed]
193. See generally City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
194. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500, 505-06.
195. See supra notes 163-192 at 20-23 and accompanying text.
196. Docia Rudley & Donna Hubbard, What a Difference a Decade Makes: Judicial Response
to State and Local Minority Business Set-Asides Ten Years After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson,
25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 39, 43 (2000) (discussing the burden of proof in strict scrutiny cases).
197. Id. at 43, 91.
198. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir.
2003).
199. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 958.
200. Id. at 971.
201. Id.
202. Id. (quoting Croson 488 U.S. at 500).
203. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 959.
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with CWC to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the ordinances.
Because CWC did not sufficiently rebut Denver's statistical evidence,
the court held that Denver met its burden in defending the constitutional-
ity of its affirmative action program.2 °5
Like the court in Concrete Works, the Third Circuit in Contractors
Ass 'n206 held that the burden of proof rests with an opponent of an af-
firmative action program.2 °7 The court stated that "plaintiffs challenging
[a] program retain the burden of persuading the district court that a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause has occurred. 20 8 Additionally, the
Third Circuit held that when a government produces facts that justify its
affirmative action program, the plaintiff has the burden to show that the
government's facts are inaccurate.2°
Ordinarily, a government bears the burden of proof to show that its
race-conscious program is necessary to achieve a compelling purpose.21°
Justice Scalia supports this proposition in his dissent by stating that it is
"the government's burden to prove that it is acting on the basis of a com-
pelling interest in remedying racial discrimination., 2 1' The distinction in
Justice Scalia's interpretation and the Tenth and Third Circuit's interpre-
tation of burden of proof lies in which party bears the initial, versus the
ultimate, burden. The Tenth and Third Circuit allocated the initial burden
of proof on the government and allocated the ultimate burden of proof on
the challenging party.212 Scalia argues that the ultimate burden of proof
always rests with the government.21 3 Scalia's arguments have merit, yet it
is evident from Croson that a government at least bears the initial bur-
den. In Croson, Justice O'Connor stated that "the purpose of strict scru-
tiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legis-
lative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool. '214 Justice O'Connor's statement implies that a court
must ensure that a government is using race-based programs in a legiti-
mate manner. Thus, the Court is suggesting that a government has the
burden of proof to show a strong basis in evidence.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 991-92.
206. Contractors Ass'n of E. Pennsylvania v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996).
207. Contractors Ass'n, 91 F.3d at 597-98.
208. Id. at 597.
209. Id. at 598.
210. See CHEMER1NSKY, supra note 13, at 520 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 919-21
(1995); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992)). Under rational basis review, the plaintiff has
the burden of proving a program's unconstitutionality. Id. at 530.
211. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 124 S. Ct. 556, 558 (2003).
212. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 959; Contractors Ass'n, 91 F.3d at 598.
213. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. at 558.
214. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
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B. What Constitutes a "Strong Basis in Evidence?"
Providing that a government bears the burden of proof to show a
strong basis in evidence that an affirmative action program is necessary,
uncertainty exists regarding the adequacy of evidence required to meet
such a burden. Croson held that "where gross statistical disparities can be
shown, they alone in a proper case may constitute prima facie proof of a
pattern or practice of discrimination. 215 Accordingly, one could interpret
Croson as requiring a government to produce prima facie evidence, or
evidence that raises an inference of discrimination as sufficient to meet
the burden of proof requirement. In contrast, Justice Scalia asserted that a
government must "prove that it is acting on the basis of a compelling
interest in remedying racial discrimination. 216 Scalia cites Croson when
he states that a government must identify discrimination "with some
specificity before [it] may use race-conscious relief., 217 Scalia equates
"some specificity" with absolute proof and contends that an inference of
discrimination is inadequate. 218 Although Scalia's arguments have merit,
Croson did not expressly hold that a government must provide conclu-
sive proof of discrimination. 219 Rather, the Croson Court stated that
prima facie proof was sufficient to show a strong basis in evidence.22 °
In Concrete Works, Denver conducted in depth disparity studies in
an effort to show a strong basis in evidence and support its affirmative
action program. 22 1 However, its statistics were flawed, glossing over
variables such as firm availability and firm size that would have invali-
222dated the Ordinance. A variable such as firm availability is crucial to a
good disparity study.223 "If availability is miscalculated, then all subse-
quent interpretations of statistics, including disparity ratios, will be in
error. '224 In effect, an erroneous "availability analysis can make a Croson
disparity study worthless. 225 Denver's studies calculated a disparity in-
dex by dividing the number of MBEs that participated in city projects by
215. Id. at 501. Such statistical disparity, however, would be of no probative value if it com-
pared the number of contracts awarded to MBEs to the general minority population. See id. Instead,
a study must compare the number of contracts awarded to MBEs to a smaller group of MBEs that
possess special qualifications to perform the jobs. See id. at 501-02.
216. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. at 558 (emphasis added).
217. Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 504).
218. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. at 558.
219. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
220. See id. at 500-01. "Where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone in a proper
case may constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination." Id. at 501. (quoting
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. U.S., 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977)).
221. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 962-69.
222. Id. at 962, 980-82.
223. George R. LaNoue, Standards for the Second Generation of Croson-Inspired Disparity
Studies, 26 URB. LAW. 485, 490 (1994). George LaNoue holds a Ph.D. and M.A from Yale Univer-
sity and is the Director of Policy Sciences at the University of Maryland Graduate School.
224. Id.
225. George R. LaNoue, Who Counts?: Determining the Availability of Minority Businesses
for Public Contracting After Croson, 21 HARv. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 793, 799 (1998).
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the total number of MBEs in the local construction market.226 Such a
"headcount approach" overstated the availability of MBEs because the
studies did not control for MBEs that were "qualified, willing, and able"
to work on city projects.227 MBEs are generally smaller and less experi-
enced than non-MBEs. 228 As a result, MBE participation rates on city
projects would be less than non-MBE participation because they are
typically less qualified and less able to undertake city construction pro-
jects.229
The Tenth Circuit assumed that MBEs were "smaller and less ex-
perienced because of industry discrimination., 230 However, the court did
not support this statement with any statistical evidence. The court as-
serted that small firm size and experience were not race-neutral factors,
as CWC attempted to argue. 231 As discussed supra, an accurate statistical
study "requires careful measurement of appropriate variables. 232 The
Tenth Circuit's assumptions, without underlying statistical support,
scarcely qualify as a careful measurement.233
Denver relied on additional studies showing that MBEs faced dis-
234 Dne
crimination when they sought to obtain credit and financing. Denver
argued that lending discrimination caused MBEs to experience barriers
to business formation from the outset.235 Thus, the studies indicated that
Denver was a passive participant by employing firms that discriminated
against MBEs. 36
Provided that MBEs actually faced lending discrimination as Den-
ver suggested, Croson expressly held that a government must consider
race-neutral means before it may implement an affirmative action pro-
gram.237 The Croson Court offered numerous race-neutral means by
which a government could combat financial discrimination, such as re-
laxed bonding requirements, increased training, and financial assis-
tance.238 The Tenth Circuit assumed that only MBEs faced barriers to
business formation. As stated in Croson, "[m]any of the formal barriers
to new entrants may be the product of bureaucratic inertia., 23 9 Thus, it
226. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 962.
227. LaNoue, supra note 223, at 799-800.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 981.
231. Id.
232. LaNoue, supra note 223, at 795.
233. Id.
234. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 977-78.
235. Id. at 977.
236. Id.
237. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
238. Id. at 509-10. The Court suggested that the city of Richmond should attempt to increase
city contracting opportunities to small businesses of all races by simplifying bidding procedures and
prohibiting discrimination by local banks in their provision of credit and bonding. Id.
239. Id. at 510.
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does not follow that barriers to business formation required Denver to
implement an affirmative action program. Many new businesses, regard-
less of their racial composition, face a multitude of obstacles. As such, an
affirmative action program is unwarranted when barriers to business
formation are experienced by MBEs and non-MBEs alike. Despite the
flaws in Denver's statistical studies, the Tenth Circuit held that Denver
met its initial burden of showing a strong basis in evidence that discrimi-
nation existed in the Denver construction industry.24
In contrast, the Third Circuit in Contractors Ass'n held that Phila-
delphia's evidence failed to meet the strong basis in evidence require-
ment.24' Philadelphia's studies did not take into account whether MBEs
were qualified and willing to perform city construction projects.242 In
addition, the studies did not account for any neutral explanations of low
MBE utilization.243 Accordingly, the court held that there was no strong
basis in evidence to support Philadelphia's affirmative action program.2
The Third Circuit correctly invalidated Philadelphia's affirmative action
program because Croson required that a disparity study should take into
account only firms that were qualified, willing, and able to perform a
245particular service.
Similarly, in Engineering Contractors,246 the Eleventh Circuit in-
validated Dade County's MBE program because a strong basis in evi-
dence did not exist.247 Unlike in Concrete Works, Dade County ac-
counted for MBE size.248 When the study controlled for this variable, the
results indicated that low MBE utilization could be attributed to size,
rather than to discrimination.249 In addition, studies indicating that mi-
norities formed businesses at a lesser rate than non-MBEs did not con-
clusively prove that discrimination existed. The Third Circuit correctly
concluded that Dade County's evidence was insufficient to justify an
affirmative action program.250
The Tenth Circuit relied on statistics that failed to live up to Cro-
son's strong basis in evidence requirement. Denver's studies were seri-
ously flawed because they: (1) failed to control for firm size and experi-
ence; (2) overestimated MBE participation rates by including all MBEs,
240. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 991.
241. Contractors Ass'n, 91 F.3d at 601.
242. Id. at 602-03.
243. Id. at 603.
244. Id. at 609-10.
245. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
246. Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of S. Florida Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895 (11th
Cir. 1997).
247. Eng'g Contractors, 122 F.3d at 926.
248. Id. at 917.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 926.
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not just those that were qualified, willing, and able; and (3) made as-
sumptions regarding discrimination in the lending industry z.25
The Third and Eleventh Circuits differed in their outcomes because
they required accurate, reliable statistics to show a strong basis in evi-
dence. Unlike the Tenth Circuit, they did not dismiss variables such as
firm size and experience, simply because such variables would have in-
validated the governments' programs. The Third and Eleventh Circuits
correctly applied Croson's strong basis in evidence requirement to show
a compelling governmental interest. Despite flaws in Denver's statistics
for failing to control for firm size and availability, the Tenth Circuit
found that a strong basis in evidence existed. As Justice Scalia argued,
"[i]f the evidence relied upon by governmental units to justify their use
of racial classifications can be as inconclusive as Denver's evidence in
this case, our former insistence upon a strong basis in evidence has been
abandoned.,
252
C. The Role of Anecdotal Evidence in Finding a Strong Basis in Evi-
dence
The Tenth Circuit, in addition to the Third and Eleventh Circuits,
weighed anecdotal evidence when determining whether a strong basis in
evidence existed. Although the anecdotal evidence presented in Engi-
neering Contractors was disconcerting, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned
that such evidence was persuasive only if combined with sufficiently
probative statistical evidence.153 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit found that
Denver's anecdotal evidence provided "persuasive, unrebutted support
for [its] initial burden., 254 According to Croson, a proper statistical foun-
dation is crucial in meeting the strong basis in evidence requirement.
255
Thus, without an accurate statistical foundation, anecdotal evidence is
ineffective to support a firm evidentiary basis on which to justify an
MBE program.2 5 Because it is difficult to verify whether anecdotal evi-
dence is "remembered, perceived, or reported accurately," such evidence
should be treated cautiously and must be supported by reliable statis-
tics. 257 In Concrete Works, Denver's statistical studies were flawed and
did not provide a strong basis in evidence.2 58 Therefore, a statistical
foundation was lacking in Concrete Works, yet the Tenth Circuit gave
Denver's anecdotal evidence a great deal of deference in concluding that
251. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 962, 977, 982; see also LaNoue, supra note 223, at 799
(stating that "a defective availability analysis can make a Croson disparity study worthless").
252. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. 556, 560-61.
253. Eng'g Contractors, 122 F.3d at 925.
254. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 990.
255. Croson, 488 U.S. at 501.
256. Eng'g Contractors, 122 F.3d at 926. ("Without the requisite statistical foundation for the
anecdotal evidence to reinforce, supplement, support, and bolster," no firm evidentiary basis exists
to justify an MBE program).
257. LaNoue, supra note 223, at 525.
258. See Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 962, 977, 982.
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Denver had met its burden.25 9 Because Denver's statistical studies did not
meet Croson's rigid standards, the Tenth Circuit's treatment of anecdotal
evidence was unwarranted.
V. CONCLUSION
Government affirmative action programs are subject to strict scru-
tiny analysis, which is the most intensive type of judicial review.260 Strict
scrutiny requires that a government provide a strong basis in evidence to
show that a program is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling govern-
mental interest. To uphold Croson's rigid standards, courts must require
governments to conduct statistical studies that accurately control for firm
size, experience, and other variables that may provide a race-neutral ex-
planation for disparate statistics. Without such reliable statistical studies,
a government should not be able to satisfy the strong basis in evidence
standard.
The Tenth Circuit attempted to apply Croson's strict scrutiny analy-
sis, but fell short. Denver's statistics were seriously flawed and, thus,
were insufficient to establish a strong basis in evidence. If Denver's stud-
ies controlled for variables such as firm size and experience, its statistics
would have been more convincing. Other circuits, such as the Third and
Eleventh, are upholding the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny standards by
requiring governments to produce accurate, thorough statistics that show
a strong basis in evidence. If strict scrutiny provides a means to "smoke
out" illegitimate uses of racial classifications, decisions such as the Tenth
Circuit's in Concrete Works will hinder the determination of "what clas-
sifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact
motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics."261 The Tenth Circuit buried strict scrutiny analysis in substan-
dard statistical studies, and the search for its appropriate application will
be extremely problematic if such statistics are the basis of future affirma-
tive action programs.
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